Rarely will we tell you that you have to read the whole thing. You have to read read the whole thing. Themes to pay extra attention to:
(1) The stamina of Israeli society under conditions of attrition, and the willingness of Israelis to sustain casualties provided that operations are genuinely necessary and making Israel safer:
Such concerns were misplaced. Israeli society demonstrated high stamina, even during wars of attrition. Israelis did not surrender to the post-September 2000 Palestinian terror campaign,[37] a sentiment reflected in recent polls.[38] Israeli society would have been willing to absorb greater casualties to bring an effective end to the Hezbollah threat. Even parents who had lost a child in the Hezbollah war backed its expansion. Nor did combat unit recruitment suffer because of the war.[39]
(2) How badly UNIFIL screws Israel. Some of our previous background posts on why the new UNIFIL mandate was inadequate are here and here,
The European-enhanced UNIFIL not only shows little inclination to use force to implement UNSCR 1701 but also hampers Israeli monitoring of weapons trafficking across the Lebanese-Syrian border. The French government, for example, denounced Israeli flights over Lebanon to monitor continuing violations of the arms embargo by Hezbollah. On October 19, 2006, the French commander of UNIFIL even threatened to shoot at Israeli planes if they came too close to his troops.[61] A few days later, Berlin complained that Israeli planes had taken aim at one of their ships. Unfortunately, the U.N. favors ineffectiveness over conflict.
(3) How Syria continues to arm Hezbollah under the UN's nose (and, actually, under the UN's de facto protection):
By November 2006, according to Israeli military officials, Hezbollah had replenished nearly half of its prewar stockpiles of short-range missiles and small arms.[65] In December 2006, Mossad chief Meir Dagan told the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that Syria continued to arm Hezbollah and sought to overthrow the independent-leaning Lebanese government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. While the new UNIFIL might be no more effective than its pre-2006 incarnation, its damaging impact is greater. It now not only restricts possible Israeli action against Hezbollah but also creates a precedent for an international force in the West Bank and/or Gaza, a move long sought by the Palestinian Liberation Organization that successive Israeli governments have resisted.
(4) The importance of academic and cultural norms on Israel's warfighting capabilities:
Post-modern notions have blurred the strategic clarity of Israel's political leadership and its defense and foreign affairs establishment. The economic cost of building a strong military force may be high, but it is not an optional expense. Too often, wishful thinking supplants reality. Should Israeli officials recognize their mistakes, however, they will find much with which to restore unquestioned Israeli regional deterrence. The war demonstrated that Israel is a strong state. It has the spirit to fight. Its soldiers won each encounter with Hezbollah. The Israeli home front displayed great resilience, and Israel's economy continued to bloom. With adequate preparation, Jerusalem might attain a clear victory in the next round, which, however unfortunate, the outcome of the 2006 war makes inevitable.
References:
* How Israel Bungled the Second Lebanon War [Middle East Quarterly]
* How Badly Does the UN Draft Screw Israel? Part I: Expanded UNIFIL Presence [MR]
* How Badly Does the UN Draft Screw Israel? Part IV: UNIFIL Will Not Get a Chapter 7 Mandate [MR]
Previously:
* UN Question Of The Day: Is Iran Smuggling Weapons To Hezbollah? Duh.
* Hezbollah Probably Lost the War, But They May Never Have Been In It To Win
* What About Disengagement Now? - Linking Lebanon II To the Disengagement Is A Really Bad Tactic
Cross-posted to:
* The Astute Bloggers
