Q: Could Airport Security Suck Worse?
A: Maybe. But frankly TSA hasn't demonstrated the kind of initiative that it would take them to sink deeper into a pit of total uselessness.
We make fun of airport security quite consistently. That's because airport security sucks. Everything about it sucks - from the refusal to profile to the insipidness of what passes for security checks. As near as we can tell, TSA personnel can be counted on to do only three things: (1) harass black businessmen traveling through the South (2) feel up white cheerleaders from the Midwest (2) take away our antiperspirant. And of all the things that piss us off, the worst is having to be delayed while these people fumble around with their worse than useless - as in it makes everyone less safe worse than useless - redundant boarding pass screening procedures. Two arguments
(1) Anyone with a a 10 year old's grasp of computers can evade a boarding pass check:
One of the things we've consistently mocked is redundant boarding pass checks (mostly because they don't work and actually make people less careful and less safe). Now it turns out all you need to beat these things is
Chris made a NWA boarding pass generator. All it does it automate the process of changing a few simple lines of HTML provided when NWA gives you a boarding pass online. Chris says it can be used to... Demonstrate that the TSA Boarding Pass/ID check is useless.
In other words, you can alter a few lines of code and print anything you want (including, say, someone else's name) on a boarding pass. You don't even have to dip into the code - you can just use a very basic image editing program (say, paint) to cut and paste over a portion of a printed boarding pass. Slate explained why this matters a year ago:
So all a terrorist needs to breeze through this loophole are two different boarding passes, both printed at home, that are identical except for the name. Check out the mock-up I made on Microsoft Publisher in about 10 minutes, using a real boarding pass I was issued last month. On the first one, you see my real name. On the second, the name has been replaced by that of Mr. Serious Threat, who we will pretend is on the No-Fly List. Say Mr. Threat and his nefarious associates buy a ticket in someone else's name (perhaps by stealing a credit card number—something criminals do without immediate detection all the time). In this case, the name of the card-theft victim (me) will be printed on the boarding pass. Mr. Threat can be pretty sure a common name like mine won't trigger the No-Fly List as his would. Then he prints out the two boarding passes: the original in my name and an altered duplicate in his name. At the first security checkpoint (the one where no scan takes place), he can breeze through using any name he wishes—even his own—just so long as his photo ID matches the altered boarding pass. Unless the security guard has the entire No-Fly List memorized, she isn't going to stop Mr. Threat. On the way to his gate he does the old switcheroo, and produces the pass with my name, which will match the computer record. Child's play. His real identity has never set off the computer's alarm bells.
So someone went ahead and automated this process to demonstrate how laughingly easy it is to evade boarding pass checks. Our government's response? They shut him down and threatened to arrest him. Because the problem is that he pointed out the existence of the loophole, and not the loophole itself.
(2) According to airport security officials, this is a big, big problem. But that's why they built in redundancy, you see. Because even if someone bad gets through check-in, they still can't do anything really dramatic because of metal detectors, x-rays, random checks, etc. Right? Yeah, not so much:
Screeners at Newark Liberty International Airport failed 20 of 22 security tests conducted by undercover U.S. agents last week, missing an array of concealed bombs and guns at checkpoints throughout the hub's three terminals, federal security officials familiar with the results said. The tests, conducted Oct. 19 by U.S. Transportation Security Administration "Red Team" agents, also revealed significant failures by screeners to follow standard operating procedures while checking passengers and their baggage for prohibited items, said the officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because it is against TSA policy to release covert-test results.
So in other words: (1) there are several 100% effective ways to get through security even if you're a terrorist on a watchlist and (2) you have a 10 out of 11 chance of getting through with a concealed bomb or gun. Not to belabor the obvious, but you send eleven terrorists into eleven different major airports in the country, and your odds of blowing up several very large planes and inflicting thousands of deaths on this country approach 100%.
But at least no one on any of the planes will have bottles of water. Dangerous, dangerous water.
UPDATE:While browsing Metroblogger we came across this gorgeous piece of work:
I took a roundtrip Southwest Flight from Sacramento to the OC this past weekend. In Sacramento, they checked my carry-on bag as usual. On my return trip at the OC airport, they informed me that I had liquids in my purse that were in the allotted limit, but they were not in a ziploc bag, so I would not be able to board unless I had them in a sealed Ziploc bag. My leftover ketchup packets and a couple of lipglosses were clearly unacceptable. The catch was that you could buy a bag from the Gift Shop...if the giftshop was open (which they were not on this typical Sunday evening). The TSA rep gave me her baggie and a stern lecture and let me on my way...
We don't even know where to begin.
We make fun of airport security quite consistently. That's because airport security sucks. Everything about it sucks - from the refusal to profile to the insipidness of what passes for security checks. As near as we can tell, TSA personnel can be counted on to do only three things: (1) harass black businessmen traveling through the South (2) feel up white cheerleaders from the Midwest (2) take away our antiperspirant. And of all the things that piss us off, the worst is having to be delayed while these people fumble around with their worse than useless - as in it makes everyone less safe worse than useless - redundant boarding pass screening procedures. Two arguments
(1) Anyone with a a 10 year old's grasp of computers can evade a boarding pass check:
One of the things we've consistently mocked is redundant boarding pass checks (mostly because they don't work and actually make people less careful and less safe). Now it turns out all you need to beat these things is
Chris made a NWA boarding pass generator. All it does it automate the process of changing a few simple lines of HTML provided when NWA gives you a boarding pass online. Chris says it can be used to... Demonstrate that the TSA Boarding Pass/ID check is useless.
In other words, you can alter a few lines of code and print anything you want (including, say, someone else's name) on a boarding pass. You don't even have to dip into the code - you can just use a very basic image editing program (say, paint) to cut and paste over a portion of a printed boarding pass. Slate explained why this matters a year ago:
So all a terrorist needs to breeze through this loophole are two different boarding passes, both printed at home, that are identical except for the name. Check out the mock-up I made on Microsoft Publisher in about 10 minutes, using a real boarding pass I was issued last month. On the first one, you see my real name. On the second, the name has been replaced by that of Mr. Serious Threat, who we will pretend is on the No-Fly List. Say Mr. Threat and his nefarious associates buy a ticket in someone else's name (perhaps by stealing a credit card number—something criminals do without immediate detection all the time). In this case, the name of the card-theft victim (me) will be printed on the boarding pass. Mr. Threat can be pretty sure a common name like mine won't trigger the No-Fly List as his would. Then he prints out the two boarding passes: the original in my name and an altered duplicate in his name. At the first security checkpoint (the one where no scan takes place), he can breeze through using any name he wishes—even his own—just so long as his photo ID matches the altered boarding pass. Unless the security guard has the entire No-Fly List memorized, she isn't going to stop Mr. Threat. On the way to his gate he does the old switcheroo, and produces the pass with my name, which will match the computer record. Child's play. His real identity has never set off the computer's alarm bells.
So someone went ahead and automated this process to demonstrate how laughingly easy it is to evade boarding pass checks. Our government's response? They shut him down and threatened to arrest him. Because the problem is that he pointed out the existence of the loophole, and not the loophole itself.
(2) According to airport security officials, this is a big, big problem. But that's why they built in redundancy, you see. Because even if someone bad gets through check-in, they still can't do anything really dramatic because of metal detectors, x-rays, random checks, etc. Right? Yeah, not so much:
Screeners at Newark Liberty International Airport failed 20 of 22 security tests conducted by undercover U.S. agents last week, missing an array of concealed bombs and guns at checkpoints throughout the hub's three terminals, federal security officials familiar with the results said. The tests, conducted Oct. 19 by U.S. Transportation Security Administration "Red Team" agents, also revealed significant failures by screeners to follow standard operating procedures while checking passengers and their baggage for prohibited items, said the officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because it is against TSA policy to release covert-test results.
So in other words: (1) there are several 100% effective ways to get through security even if you're a terrorist on a watchlist and (2) you have a 10 out of 11 chance of getting through with a concealed bomb or gun. Not to belabor the obvious, but you send eleven terrorists into eleven different major airports in the country, and your odds of blowing up several very large planes and inflicting thousands of deaths on this country approach 100%.
But at least no one on any of the planes will have bottles of water. Dangerous, dangerous water.
UPDATE:While browsing Metroblogger we came across this gorgeous piece of work:
I took a roundtrip Southwest Flight from Sacramento to the OC this past weekend. In Sacramento, they checked my carry-on bag as usual. On my return trip at the OC airport, they informed me that I had liquids in my purse that were in the allotted limit, but they were not in a ziploc bag, so I would not be able to board unless I had them in a sealed Ziploc bag. My leftover ketchup packets and a couple of lipglosses were clearly unacceptable. The catch was that you could buy a bag from the Gift Shop...if the giftshop was open (which they were not on this typical Sunday evening). The TSA rep gave me her baggie and a stern lecture and let me on my way...
We don't even know where to begin.
