Mere Rhetoric Evaluates Palestinian Opinion Poll, Walks Away Unsurprised
At Winds Of Change, Armed Liberal sees reasons to be optimistic about the chances for an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal:
Note that reaching a peace agreement was the most important for 17.2%, improving economic conditions was most important for 15.6 percent, fighting corruption was most important for 24.3 percent, and ensuring the continuation of the intifada was most important for 3.0 percent. I've argued for a while that the bulk of the Palestinian people - like the bulk of people anywhere want the same thing - a future for their children, a safe home, and the chance to build a better life for themselves.
Those numbers are indeed promising. But a deeper look at some of the other answers gives reason to doubt that the low interest in parties who will ensure the continuation of the Intifada actually signals a change in the Palestinian public's pattern of supporting armed struggle even if they were given a state.*:
25) Palestinians are currently debating the issue of the collection of arms from armed Palestinian groups and factions, stipulated in the Road Map as a PA commitment. Do you support or oppose such a collection of arms?
In other words, even though only 3% of the Palestinian public considers ensuring the continuation of the Intifada "most important", about 60% oppose or strongly oppose taking even the most rudimentary steps necessary to stopping the Intifada.
Furthermore, twice as many Palestinians believe that the Palestinians rather than the Israelis are the winners "in the ongoing armed conflict that has started in September 2000 between Israel and the Palestinians" (34.5% vs. 17.3%), while an even greater percentage believe that the "majority of Palestinians" believe that the Palestinians rather than the Israelis have been "the winner in the armed conflict" (46.8% vs. 18.7%). A total of 66.1% answered "yes" or "definitely yes" to the question "do you believe that armed confrontations so far has helped achieved Palestinian national and political rights in ways that negotiations could not achieve?"
When you couple these convictions of victory with some other results - that 45.6% of respondents think that "a political settlement is not possible ever" and that 72.4% believe that "lasting peace possible between Israelis and Palestinians" is "impossible" or "definitely impossible", the result that only 3% of Palestinians are concerned about "the ability of the list [they're voting for] to insure the continuation of the intifada" becomes a little less comforting. Of course they're not concerned about the ability of a leader to insure continuation of the intifada: they think that the continuation of violence will take care of itself, that no matter who is elected, any Palestinian leader will inevitably have to fight Israel.
And even these numbers are confounded by the Palestinian public's overwhelming focus on internal corruption: 97.8% of respondents say that "integrity and incorruptibilty of candidate" is "important" or "very important", a plurality of respondents ranked "the ability of the list to fight corruption and implement reform measures" as "their most important factor", and a plurality of respondents think that "fighting corruption and implementing reforms" should be the government's "first priority". Now, given that 86.5% of respondents think there is "corruption in Palestinian Authority institutions" and 49.5% think that "the fight against corruption in the PA" has "not changed" since "the elections of Mahmud Abbas", it's unsurprising that when asked to choose the party "most able to fight corruption and implement reforms", 47% responded "Hamas/Islamic Jihad" while only 36.5% answered Fatah (and that's just the people willing to criticize Fatah: 45.5% of people said "no" to "can people in the West Bank and Gaza today criticize the PA without fear?"). So course the Palestinian public is not concerned with "the ability of the list to insure the continuation of the intifada" - many of them are already voting for Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the extreme terrorist parties, for other reasons!
The picture that emerges from these numbers is that: (a) the vast majority of the Palestinian public thinks that they've been winning the war so far, (b) they think the war will continue indefinitely, and (c) they're unwilling to take even the most basic steps to deescalate that war.
But there are answers that look like bright spots:
23) If Israel disengages fully in the Gaza strip, including the evacuation of all settlements and the Philadelphi route, and if it lifts the air and sea blockade on the Gaza strip, would you under these conditions support or oppose carrying out armed attacks against Israeli targets from the Gaza Strip?
Of course a majority oppose launching attacks from the Gaza Strip - that's Hamas's position! They tried to launch attacks from the Gaza Strip, they got leveled by the IDF, they promised to behave themselves - but only from the Gaza Strip! The question "...would you under these conditions support or oppose carrying out armed attacks against Israeli targets from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank" wasn't asked.
What about the 76.5% who "definitely support" or "support" "the current mutual cease fire with Israel"? It's easy to support the current mutual ceasefire when the conditions of that ceasefire essentially come down to: the Palestinians get to carry out suicide bombings, rocket attacks, roadside bombings, instigations to riot, and child suicide bombings while Israel is pressured not to retaliate so as not to "threaten the fragile ceasefire."
There might be one big, gaping flaw in this explanation - it relies on the idea that the Palestinian public thinks that the Intifada is inevitable and is therefore unconcerned about its continuation, but when asked "which of the following political parties do you support", 41.2% choose Fatah vs. 30.1% for Hamas and 2.6% for Islamic Jihad (two terrorist organizations irrevocably committed to the destruction of Israel).
First of all, support for Fatah and support for violence are not exactly incompatible. But even more to the point - it's not clear that the fact that a plurality of Palestinians support Fatah means that there is any significant support for negotiating with Israel. If Fatah's support was really being driven by its relative moderation towards Israel, then one would expect the gap between overall Fatah support and overall Hamas support to be much larger, because 64.9% of respondents thought that Fatah is the best party to "push the peace process forward" (compared to 21.7% for Hamas/Islamic Jihad) and 43.5% think that Fatah is the best party for "protecting refugee rights in negotiations" (compared to 36.4% for Hamas/Islamic Jihad). It's far more likely that Fatah's support is being driven by their ability to manage existing civil infrastructure, general satisfaction with Abbas (60.3%), or even apprehension about Islamism from the traditionally secular Palestinian public.
At several points where one would expect the question, this poll fails to ask outright if the Palestinian public is willing to give up armed struggle against Israel. In the weakest sense, it doesn't demonstrate that, once issues of corruption and crime are solved, the Palestinians won't still very strongly seek to continue attacks against Israel; in the strongest sense, it indicates that to the extent that they refuse to disarm and deny the possibility of a peace deal, there is an expectation of returning to attacks against Israel. So in one sense, Armed Liberal is right: the poll demonstrates that this time around, the Palestinians are not voting based on Intifada-related issues - but the implication that they're willing to give up fighting for "the chance to build a better life for themselves" simply does not follow.
* This poll does indicate a change in that specific measure: a very positive 74.6% would support "full reconciliation between Israel and the Palestinian state" if "a peace agreement is reached, and a Palestinian state is established and recognized by Israel." Make no mistake: this is progress. But it's not progress that lends itself well to confidence building measures that risk Israeli security when less than 15% of respondents think that reconciliation is possible some time within the next decade and 42.3% don't think its possible at all - and when they're willing to support not dismantling terrorist infrastructure based on those calculations.
Note that reaching a peace agreement was the most important for 17.2%, improving economic conditions was most important for 15.6 percent, fighting corruption was most important for 24.3 percent, and ensuring the continuation of the intifada was most important for 3.0 percent. I've argued for a while that the bulk of the Palestinian people - like the bulk of people anywhere want the same thing - a future for their children, a safe home, and the chance to build a better life for themselves.
Those numbers are indeed promising. But a deeper look at some of the other answers gives reason to doubt that the low interest in parties who will ensure the continuation of the Intifada actually signals a change in the Palestinian public's pattern of supporting armed struggle even if they were given a state.*:
25) Palestinians are currently debating the issue of the collection of arms from armed Palestinian groups and factions, stipulated in the Road Map as a PA commitment. Do you support or oppose such a collection of arms?
| 1) Strongly support | 9.9 | 9.0 | 11.5 |
| 2) support | 27.8 | 29.5 | 25.1 |
| 3) oppose | 42.9 | 43.3 | 42.1 |
| 4) strongly oppose | 16.9 | 15.7 | 19.0 |
| 5) DK/NA | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.0 |
| Total% | West Bank% | Gaza Strip% |
In other words, even though only 3% of the Palestinian public considers ensuring the continuation of the Intifada "most important", about 60% oppose or strongly oppose taking even the most rudimentary steps necessary to stopping the Intifada.
Furthermore, twice as many Palestinians believe that the Palestinians rather than the Israelis are the winners "in the ongoing armed conflict that has started in September 2000 between Israel and the Palestinians" (34.5% vs. 17.3%), while an even greater percentage believe that the "majority of Palestinians" believe that the Palestinians rather than the Israelis have been "the winner in the armed conflict" (46.8% vs. 18.7%). A total of 66.1% answered "yes" or "definitely yes" to the question "do you believe that armed confrontations so far has helped achieved Palestinian national and political rights in ways that negotiations could not achieve?"
When you couple these convictions of victory with some other results - that 45.6% of respondents think that "a political settlement is not possible ever" and that 72.4% believe that "lasting peace possible between Israelis and Palestinians" is "impossible" or "definitely impossible", the result that only 3% of Palestinians are concerned about "the ability of the list [they're voting for] to insure the continuation of the intifada" becomes a little less comforting. Of course they're not concerned about the ability of a leader to insure continuation of the intifada: they think that the continuation of violence will take care of itself, that no matter who is elected, any Palestinian leader will inevitably have to fight Israel.
And even these numbers are confounded by the Palestinian public's overwhelming focus on internal corruption: 97.8% of respondents say that "integrity and incorruptibilty of candidate" is "important" or "very important", a plurality of respondents ranked "the ability of the list to fight corruption and implement reform measures" as "their most important factor", and a plurality of respondents think that "fighting corruption and implementing reforms" should be the government's "first priority". Now, given that 86.5% of respondents think there is "corruption in Palestinian Authority institutions" and 49.5% think that "the fight against corruption in the PA" has "not changed" since "the elections of Mahmud Abbas", it's unsurprising that when asked to choose the party "most able to fight corruption and implement reforms", 47% responded "Hamas/Islamic Jihad" while only 36.5% answered Fatah (and that's just the people willing to criticize Fatah: 45.5% of people said "no" to "can people in the West Bank and Gaza today criticize the PA without fear?"). So course the Palestinian public is not concerned with "the ability of the list to insure the continuation of the intifada" - many of them are already voting for Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the extreme terrorist parties, for other reasons!
The picture that emerges from these numbers is that: (a) the vast majority of the Palestinian public thinks that they've been winning the war so far, (b) they think the war will continue indefinitely, and (c) they're unwilling to take even the most basic steps to deescalate that war.
But there are answers that look like bright spots:
23) If Israel disengages fully in the Gaza strip, including the evacuation of all settlements and the Philadelphi route, and if it lifts the air and sea blockade on the Gaza strip, would you under these conditions support or oppose carrying out armed attacks against Israeli targets from the Gaza Strip?
| 1) Definitely support | 6.9 | 7.4 | 6.1 |
| 2) support | 23.4 | 23.5 | 23.1 |
| 3) oppose | 53.1 | 53.9 | 51.6 |
| 4) Definitely oppose | 13.4 | 11.4 | 16.8 |
| 5) DK/NA | 3.3 | 3.8 | 2.4 |
| Total% | West Bank% | Gaza Strip% |
Of course a majority oppose launching attacks from the Gaza Strip - that's Hamas's position! They tried to launch attacks from the Gaza Strip, they got leveled by the IDF, they promised to behave themselves - but only from the Gaza Strip! The question "...would you under these conditions support or oppose carrying out armed attacks against Israeli targets from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank" wasn't asked.
What about the 76.5% who "definitely support" or "support" "the current mutual cease fire with Israel"? It's easy to support the current mutual ceasefire when the conditions of that ceasefire essentially come down to: the Palestinians get to carry out suicide bombings, rocket attacks, roadside bombings, instigations to riot, and child suicide bombings while Israel is pressured not to retaliate so as not to "threaten the fragile ceasefire."
There might be one big, gaping flaw in this explanation - it relies on the idea that the Palestinian public thinks that the Intifada is inevitable and is therefore unconcerned about its continuation, but when asked "which of the following political parties do you support", 41.2% choose Fatah vs. 30.1% for Hamas and 2.6% for Islamic Jihad (two terrorist organizations irrevocably committed to the destruction of Israel).
First of all, support for Fatah and support for violence are not exactly incompatible. But even more to the point - it's not clear that the fact that a plurality of Palestinians support Fatah means that there is any significant support for negotiating with Israel. If Fatah's support was really being driven by its relative moderation towards Israel, then one would expect the gap between overall Fatah support and overall Hamas support to be much larger, because 64.9% of respondents thought that Fatah is the best party to "push the peace process forward" (compared to 21.7% for Hamas/Islamic Jihad) and 43.5% think that Fatah is the best party for "protecting refugee rights in negotiations" (compared to 36.4% for Hamas/Islamic Jihad). It's far more likely that Fatah's support is being driven by their ability to manage existing civil infrastructure, general satisfaction with Abbas (60.3%), or even apprehension about Islamism from the traditionally secular Palestinian public.
At several points where one would expect the question, this poll fails to ask outright if the Palestinian public is willing to give up armed struggle against Israel. In the weakest sense, it doesn't demonstrate that, once issues of corruption and crime are solved, the Palestinians won't still very strongly seek to continue attacks against Israel; in the strongest sense, it indicates that to the extent that they refuse to disarm and deny the possibility of a peace deal, there is an expectation of returning to attacks against Israel. So in one sense, Armed Liberal is right: the poll demonstrates that this time around, the Palestinians are not voting based on Intifada-related issues - but the implication that they're willing to give up fighting for "the chance to build a better life for themselves" simply does not follow.
* This poll does indicate a change in that specific measure: a very positive 74.6% would support "full reconciliation between Israel and the Palestinian state" if "a peace agreement is reached, and a Palestinian state is established and recognized by Israel." Make no mistake: this is progress. But it's not progress that lends itself well to confidence building measures that risk Israeli security when less than 15% of respondents think that reconciliation is possible some time within the next decade and 42.3% don't think its possible at all - and when they're willing to support not dismantling terrorist infrastructure based on those calculations.
