Liberal Foreign Policy Experts: This Ahmadinejad Reelection Was Just So Unpredictable!

This is like trying to potty train an academic. Khamenei made his decision as early as last August and told Ahmadinejad to prepare for a second term, publicly reiterating his support just a few weeks ago. Even if that wasn’t true, Ahmadinejad’s allies have taken over Iran’s foreign policy apparatus and Interior Ministry, demonstrating that they either have Khamenei’s ear or are powerful enough to force his hand. And even if that wasn’t true, Ahmadinejad was surging electorally as late as mid-May, guaranteeing a vote at least close enough to rig.

But “Iran is dominated by hardliners” violates the party line of the Iran Lobby, the diffuse group of pro-Iranian journalists, academics and diplomats that has set up shop in the White House. So they went to work. In May the AP’s Ali Akbar Dareini, having previously discovered that Ahmadinejad actually welcomed talks with Obama, now re-described Ahmadinejad as “hard-line” but reported that he was on the outs with Khamenei. This is a standard trope that gets trotted out whenever there’s an engagement push: the Carnegie Endowment’s Karim Sadjadpour was feeding it to journalists on the eve of Obama’s Inauguration.

Ahmadinejad still needed a credible challenger though. In February it was definitely going to be Khatami, who was going to “alter Iran’s direction.” Except he bowed out, not least of all because hardliners were too powerful and blocked pro-Khatami websites.

So ostensible Iran experts moved on to Mousavi, who according to Rand guru Alireza Nader was a “promising presidential contender” who offered “a potential opportunity to alter the relationship between Iran and the West… including [the issue of] Iran’s nuclear program.” Robert Worth declared that “a vast opposition movement has arisen, flooding the streets of Iran’s major cities with cheering, green-clad supporters of Mir Hussein Moussavi.”

Trita Parsi, the head of the National Iranian American Council, is a Johns Hopkins PhD who wrote his anti-Israel dissertation under Fukuyama and Brzezinski. He used his academic ethos and HuffPo column to congratulate Congressional Democrats on not sanctioning Iran because “the momentum in the last week has clearly been with Moussavi.” And Roger Cohen, of course, simply could not be contained:

They’re calling it the “green tsunami,” a transformative wave unfurling down the broad avenues of the Iranian capital. Call it what you will, but the city is agog at the campaign of Mir Hussein Moussavi, the reformist candidate seeking to unseat President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad… Iran, its internal fissures exposed as never before, is teetering again on the brink of change. For months now, I’ve been urging another look at Iran, beyond dangerous demonization of it as a totalitarian state. Seldom has the country looked less like one than in these giddy June days. I wandered in a sea of green ribbons, hats, banners and bandannas… Moussavi’s wife, Zahra Rahnavard, sporting a floral hijab that taunted grey-black officialdom, warned the president that: “If there is vote rigging, Iran will rise up.” A Moussavi kite hovered; a shout went up that “It’s even written in the sky.”

Back in reality, Moussavi wasn’t going to offer any real change on issues like nukes or Hezbollah and Hamas. But don’t let that distract you from how the “promising contender” and “Khamenei is wobbling” nonsense were also cut out of whole cloth.

As of this morning the Iranian political hierarchy has forcefully decreed that it’s game over for Moussavi. So let’s check in with the authoritative and oft-cited panel of experts who predicted the exact opposite:

* Karim Sadjadpour, who was feeding journalists expert opinion about Ahmadinejad/Khamenei tensions:

“I don’t think anyone anticipated this level of fraudulence,” Reuters cited the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Karim Sadjadpour. “This was a selection, not an election. At least authoritarian regimes like Syria and Egypt have no democratic pretences. In retrospect it appears this entire campaign was a show: (Supreme Leader) Ayatollah (Ali) Khamenei wasn’t ever going to let Ahmadinejad lose.“

Perhaps in retrospect it might appear that way, yes.

* Alireza Nader, who opined about all the “promise” and “potential” of the anti-Ahmadinejad factions:

As Rand’s Alireza Nader put it, “The power of the traditional ruling elite — men such as Ayatollah Rafsanjani — has been effectively challenged by Ahmadinejad and his supporters, including top-ranking and fundamentalist members of the Revolutionary Guards.”

Also apparently the case, although perhaps that too might have been predicted given the Ahmadinejad camp’s sustained takeover of Iranian institutions.

* Trita Parsi, who was very sure that appeasing Iranian hard-liners was the way to empower Iranian moderates:

“I’m in disbelief that this could be the case,” Reuters cited Trita Parsi. “It’s one thing if Ahmadinejad had won the first round with 51 or 55 per cent. But this number … just sounds tremendously strange in a way that doesn’t add up… Which then raises the question… as to whether a reassessment is needed of the assumption that Khamenei enjoys the position of strength that so often is ascribed to him. If this is not a favorable situation, why is he going along with it? Is he too under pressure from circles in the Guard?”

An interesting question, although one that neglects the possibility that Khamenei is in control and pursuing the confrontationist Revolution-era preferences he’s known to hold.

* Still waiting on what Roger Cohen is going to say, but his NYT colleague Robert Worth reported the election results with a perfunctory “the authorities declared Mahmoud Ahmadinejad the official winner…,” gave the lopsided numbers in paragraph 7, and spent the rest of the article insisting that Moussavi really is popular and Ahmadinejad really is divisive. It’s the journalistic equivalent of a petulant child stamping his foot, except the child here is complicit in a public campaign to undermine meaningful action against an apocalyptic regime within a hair’s breadth of WMDs.

Genuine change may eventually come to Iran, either through slow institutional evolution or mass popular uprising. But when and if it does, these tools are certainly going to be among the last to know. Which begs the question of they keep getting quoted, let alone why they’re allowed to influence policy.

References:
* Diplomatic Sophistication Heartbreak: Tension Between Iranian Political Factions A Little Exaggerated [MR]
* Khamenei offers implicit support to Ahmadinejad [AFP]
* Smug Liberal Sophistication Untroubled By Undeniable Evidence That Hardliners Are Winning In Iran [MR]
* Mohammad Khatami to run in Iran’s presidential election [LAT]
* Ahmadinejad leads Iran’s presidential election poll by big margin [Xinhua]
* The “Iran Lobby” Moves Into The White House [MR]
* The WH’s Eight-Step Plan For Detonating The US-Israel Relationship [MR]
* Iranian president says talks with US possible [Jakarta Post]
* Iran supreme leader rebukes president over powers [Guardian]
* Ahmadinejad vs. Khamenei? [FP Passport]
* Ahmadinejad Predecessor Planning Presidential Bid [WaPo]
* Iran’s Khatami won’t run for president, state news agency says [CNN]
* Iran blocks websites promoting Khatami [YNet]
* Iran’s promising presidential contender [Japan Times]
* News Analysis – In Ahmadinejad vs. Moussavi, Iranians Weigh Chance for Change [Worth / NYT]
* Op-Ed Columnist – Iran Awakens Yet Again [Cohen / NYT]
* Turns Out, Iran’s “Moderate” Candidate Started Their Nuke Program [MR]
* ANALYSIS / All Iran candidates will bolster Hamas, Hezbollah ties [Ha'aretz]
* Game over in Iran? [FP Passport]
* Iran elections (Updated Saturday) [FP Cable]
* Ahmadinejad Re-Elected; Protests Flare [Worth / NYT]